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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research problem
The growing research on fiscal and political federalism in economics (as well as
rational choice political science) basically shares two main assumptions regard-
ing federal institutions: it takes democratic and symmetric federations as the
reference point. Democracy means that the decision making is based on elec-
tions and/or referenda, which effectively constraint the actions of politicians.
Symmetry means that the ”degree of devolution” for all regions is identical. In
particular, if both federal and regional budgets are funded by a common split
tax, the de-jure retention rate is identical for all states. It goes without saying
that there is a multitude of models looking at economic asymmetry between
regions: most federations include states or regions with significantly different
economic potential, population and territory, obviously influencing both their
comparative economic performance and their behavior in the federal bargain-
ing.1 However, the economic asymmetry does not (necessarily) provide an iden-
tity mapping into the asymmetric devolution in terms of formal institutions and
informal policy making (what I refer to as ”asymmetric federation” in this pa-
per): this issue requires careful analysis. Although these assumptions are helpful
to derive valuable insights in the development of federations, it is obvious that
they do not cover the variety of institutional and political environments existing
1For example, in Argentina four industrially dominant provinces and the federal district of
Buenos Aires account for 78% of the nation’s industrial production and 70% of the population.
In Australia New South Wales includes 35% of the population, whereas Tasmania accounts
for less than 3%. In Germany the largest Land North Rhine Westphalia accounts for 21% of
the population of the federative republic, whereas the city-state of Bremen includes less than
1%. In India Uttar Pradesh includes 16% of the whole population, and Sikkim less than 0.1%.
The largest U.S. state California accounts for 11% of the population, and the smallest state
Wyoming includes less than 1% of the population. The largest Brazilian state Sao Paulo is
more than 100 times as large in terms of population, as the smallest one (Roraima). Yukon
includes less than 0.1% of the Canada’s population and Ontario 38%. Even in Austria, which
is significantly smaller, than other federations mentioned above, the largest Land of Vienna
is about 30 times as large in terms of population, as the smallest one (Burgenland).
10
in federal systems.
First, it is safe to claim that the fiscal capacity of individual regions (i.e. the
resources they keep to implement their economic policy) is heterogeneous in
virtually all federations. However, this difference can simply be an outcome of
the free discretion of regional governments over their own tax rates and bases
(as in the U.S.), of the application of identical rules to regions with different
endowment (for example, if there are several split taxes with different de-jure
retention rates, and regions have different endowments in terms of tax bases,
unavoidably the overall share of tax revenue kept by individual regions will be
unequal) or of the redistribution of the common pool of resources at the federal
level through transfers. However, another reason for the differences in fiscal
capacity (which I focus on in this paper) is that the rules applied to individual
regions are different. This form of asymmetric federalism (as it is usually re-
ferred to in political science) is typical for a wide variety of countries.
For example, the developing Spanish federalism is asymmetric per construc-
tion: the autonomous regions (communidad autonoma) were not established by
the constitution, but the latter institutionalized a procedure, which could be
used for their creation, as well as for ”accepting” responsibilities. Specifically,
the retention rates for shared taxes are not identical over the communities; two
of them enjoy special ”foral regime” with higher fiscal independence. The same
is true for the British devolution: the degree of autonomy of Wales and Scotland
is set separately, as well as the (possible) autonomy of England (McGregor and
Swales, 2003). Federal entities in Belgium and Canada enjoy partly different
rights: Canada is a prominent example of unilateral concessions to a particular
region of the federation in order to maintain the unity of the federal state (Que-
bec). India originally included four types of states depending on their historical
origin (British rule, former principalities etc.) and currently still has specific
regulations for ethnic minorities (Rao and Singh, 2004). At the moment let me
put aside the question why this particular form of federalism appears at all:
although the results of bargaining over varying retention rates may be identical
to that of bargaining over transfers when retention rates are identical, there are
countries where regions obviously prefer the former to the latter. In this paper
the existence of asymmetries is assumed as given. More importantly, it seems to
be the core of the ”autonomy” arrangements in unitary states, when individual
regions receive special status and higher autonomy in economic decision-making
(in political science often referred to as ”federacies”).2
Second, although there have been important changes over the last decade,
2An incomplete list of this arrangements includes Alan Islands in Finland, five special
regions (Sicily, Sardinia, South Tyrol, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Valle d’Acosta) in Italy, Zanzibar
in Tanzania, the Atlantic Cost in Nicaragua, Corsica in France, Minadanao in Philippines,
Gagauszia in Moldova, West Papua in Indonesia, Bougainvillea in Papua New Guinea, Green-
land and Faeroes in Denmark, Madeira and Azores in Portugal, Jersey and Man in the UK,
Xianggang in China, Crimea in Ukraine or Karakaplpakstan in Uzbekistan.
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the modern political economics (including economics of decentralization) is still
to an important extent the economics of democracies. However, the political
regime is yet another reasonable ”candidate” for influencing the degree of de-
centralization. Although, as it will be discussed below, there is some research
dealing with effects of the democratization on the process of devolution, there is
still at least one neglected area: internal political differences between different
levels of government in a federation. Regional differentiation of the level and
the type of democracy is quite typical for federations in developing and tran-
sition countries. The first source of the variation is the (relative) weakness of
the federal center, often unable to control the development of regional political
institutions and therefore limit the diversity of regional political equilibria (Mc-
Mann, 2006). The second source is the need to compromise with regional elites
in the process of democratic transition, leading to ”pockets” of democracy or au-
tocracy. In several cases the very ability to carry out the democratic transition
may be associated with an ”implicit contract” with the regional elites, main-
taining their autocratic rule. Finally, economic and ethnic differences among
regions lead to a strong differentiation of the bargaining power of individual ac-
tors; in a world where these actors bargain not only within rules, but foremost
about rules, it leads to the differentiation of political institutions.
This trend has been observed in different parts of the world. In Latin Amer-
ica Brazil, Argentina and Mexico included regions with different political sys-
tems (Gibson, 2004): for example, the transition from the dictatorship of the
Institutional-Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico started with the develop-
ment of individual democratic regions; however, even after the democratization
occurred on the federal level several regional leaders maintained their quasi-
authoritarian power. In India regional governments were able not only to
change the specifics of regional political systems, but also to establish signif-
icantly different economic systems.3 The traditional channels of control of re-
gional governments through the constitutional court, the federal legislature or
the national political culture are much weaker in these countries, than in the
developed world. However, one should not necessarily be looking for developing
countries and weak democracies to find examples of different political systems
in one federal structure. Quite a few of the U.S. states in the early 20s century
were controlled by powerful political machines eliminating any free competition
at the elections; the dominance of the Democratic party in the U.S. South was
based on various voting restrictions (like literacy tests), introduced to under-
mine the electoral basis of the opposition (see Besley et al., 2007, for a survey of
anecdotal evidence). The ’subnational authoriatrianism’ has also been reported
in Spain and Southern Italy.
On the contrary, autocratic states sometimes include regions with a higher level
of democratization. The traditional monarchies of Central and Eastern Europe
3For example, in West Bengal, where the Communist Party maintained the power
monopoly for decades (Chen and Sil, 2007).
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in the 19s century partly included regions significantly more successful in terms
of the democratic development. A good example is the special status of Finland
in the Russian Empire. The territory maintained its own parliament (though
no publicly elected legislature existed in Russia) and a legal system, which was
quite developed even as opposed to other European countries of that period (for
example, Finland was among the first territories in the world to provide women
voting rights). Autocracies sometimes allow limited political competition on
the local level (like China, which has recently introduced free elections on the
village level, see Thurston, 1998), maintaining absolute control over political
developments on the federal or central level. The reasons why a non-democratic
center credibly commits (and maintains the commitment) to allow free elections
on the regional or local level can differ and include some sorts of political exper-
iments or outcomes of internal power struggles and external pressure. However,
systems with more advanced democratization on provincial level sometimes re-
sult from a slow overall democratization process, like in Mexico; in this case,
however, they are likely to be less stable (Diaz-Cayeros, 2003).
Finally, formal pure non-democratic federations seem to be a relatively rare
phenomenon in the modern world (an example is probably the United Arab
Emirates), since a non-democracy has difficulties in maintaining rule of law
necessary to establish clear separation of powers between the federal and the
regional level. However, in a broad sense, non-democratic political system with
independent regional and central elites and a relative balance of power between
them determining the distribution of the fiscal revenue are often present in large
countries, if the political control of the center is not absolute. Latin Amer-
ica experienced a significant move towards decentralization under authoritarian
leaders (Eaton, 2006), and so does China today.
The existence of asymmetric and / or non-democratic federations and the qual-
ity of policy making and governance in these structures is per se an interesting
question for political economics. What is, however, even more important is that
asymmetric federations often provide unique laboratories to test a multitude
of general questions of public and political economics in an intranational set-
ting. It is well known that the international samples of countries suffer from
important problems: quality of data may often be incompatible, there is a se-
lection bias and / or small-sample problem etc. Hence, using the intranational
variation of the parameter of interest may become an interesting alternative,
especially because country knowledge may make specific strategies of identifica-
tion (unavailable in general settings) useful. This thesis attempts to apply the
asymmetric federalism case in two main frameworks.
First, it looks at the problem of the endogenous decentralization - a field
growing extensively over the last decade (Lockwood, 2006). Unlike the tradi-
tional implicitly or explicitly normative fiscal federalism, the endogenous de-
centralization approach does not deal with the optimal centralization and the
power allocation between the center and the regions, but rather studies the (in-
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ternal) processes within a federal system that lead to a specific allocation of
decision powers or fiscal revenue. Basically, it comes down to a (supposedly)
simple empirical question: why are some countries more (de)centralized than the
others? Unlike the dominant literature on endogenous decentralization, using
either international setting (Pryor, 1968; Oates, 1972; Kee, 1977; Pommerehne,
1977; Bahl and Nath, 1986; Wasylenko, 1987; Patsouratis, 1990; Vaubel, 1996,
2009; Panizza, 1999; Cerniglia, 2003; Garret and Rodden, 2003; Diaz-Cayeros,
2004; Stegarescu, 2006; Arzaghi and Henderson, 2006; Letelier, 2005; Treisman,
2006) or internal decentralization within regions (mostly in the U.S. and Switzer-
land, cf. Pryor, 1967; Litvack, Oates, 1970; Giertz, 1976, 1983; Mullen, 1980;
Wallis and Oates, 1988; Baker, 2000; Feld et al., 2008), the first three papers
of this thesis specifically use the setting of an asymmetric federation to study
the determinants of decentralization. Second, the existence of the subnational
variation of political regimes provides an interesting field for research on the
comparative performance of democracies and autocracies. Although
the ”democracy-and-growth” studies include literally hundreds of papers and
thousands of regressions (Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2008), virtually all of
them, once again, restrict their attention to comparing performance of different
countries (or of individual countries over time). Here, once again, looking at
panels of regions might be an advantage, as it is discussed in this thesis.
1.2 Structure of the thesis
This thesis is comprised of four papers. The first three deal with the prob-
lem of endogenous decentralization in asymmetric federations, including those
with variation of political regimes. To start with, the first paper (Chapter 2)
considers the problem from a broad perspective. Using the data from the Rus-
sian Federation in 1995-1999, it looks at three measures of devolution: fiscal,
regulatory and constitutional decentralization, and attempts to find out their
interrelation and their driving factors. Basically, there are two main findings
from the chapter. First, three aspects of decentralization (although evolving
simultaneously and influenced by interacting (or even identical) agents) do not
seem to be correlated. Second, the set of determinants of the decentralization,
for which the zero effect could be rejected, is also different: while for the fiscal
decentralization bargaining power and preferences seem to play the crucial role,
regulatory decentralization is influenced by bargaining rules and path depen-
dence factors. The sets of outliers for different dimensions of decentralization
also differ.
This result challenges the traditional approach to empirical studies of decen-
tralization, which take a variety of post-constitutional indicators as proxies for
allocation of authorities. Hence, it becomes important to study the factors in-
fluencing the divergence of de-jure power and de-facto control over resources.
Therefore in the next step (Chapter 3) the thesis looks at a specific mechanism of
fiscal decentralization in an asymmetric federal structure. Once again, I use the
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data for the Russian Federation (for 1995-1999 and 2000-2006) to test different
hypotheses regarding the strategic tax collection behavior as a driving force of
the fiscal decentralization. In a centralized federation where regional and federal
budgets are financed by taxes (mostly) determined by the federal parliament,
regions, if they are able to control their tax authorities, have incentives to ma-
nipulate the tax collection and tax auditing effort for various reasons. If there
is a huge tax avoidance (and therefore the tax collection measures are limited
and unable to cover all taxpayers), one of the outcomes of the strategic tax
collection may be shifts of the retention rates; thus even centralized federations
become subject to the de-facto devolution. The chapter indeed finds evidence
of the strategic tax collection as factor of the fiscal decentralization in Russia.
Both Chapters 2 and 3 included a measure of democracy in individual regions
among covariates; however, it did not produce significant and robust results.
Therefore Chapter 4 looks at the problem from a theoretical perspective: it
constructs a very simple model of an asymmetric federation, where regional
and federal governments may have (potentially different) democratic and non-
democratic political regimes, and looks at the properties of mapping from eco-
nomic and political fundamentals (heterogeneity, size of regions, secession costs,
political regimes) into retention rates in a setting allowing for secession. There
are three main results to be reported. First, as expected (and as demonstrated
in the previous chapters for the Russian case) regions with a large territory, low
secession costs and a high ”preference distance” from the federal government
have larger retention rates. Second, the degree of decentralization in a pure
democracy (where both regional and federal governments are democratic) is
higher, than in a pure non-democracy only for specific conditions on preference
distance / information flows. Finally, hybrid regimes (where federal and regional
governments have different political systems) are more centralized, than pure
non-democracies.
While Chapters 2 and 3 had the problem of endogenous decentralization in an
asymmetric federation in focus, and Chapter 4 looked at asymmetric federation
with various level of democracy, Chapter 5 specifically concentrates on the sub-
national variation of democracy in order to study the ”democracy-and-growth”
nexus. Looking at a sample of Russian regions in 2000-2004, it uses various
techniques to regress the annual growth rates on the degree of democracy and
the size of bureaucratic apparatus in individual regions. The main finding is
that the democracy has a robust U-shape impact on economic growth: hybrid
regimes perform significantly worse than both democracies and autocracies.4
The findings for bureaucracy are less robust: in cross-sections and panel data
settings without region fixed effects, the bureaucracy increase seems to hamper
economic growth; the result vanishes for estimations with region fixed effects.
Finally, the chapter reports some results on the interaction of democracy and
4It should be noted that I use different definitions of a hybrid regime in chapters 4 (a
country with different political regimes on different levels of government) and 5 (a region
which combines features of democracies and non-democracies in the regional political system).
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size of bureaucracy.
Individual specific results of the chapters are summarizes in the respective con-
clusions; however, there at the end of the thesis I discuss some general results
which could be obtained from both theoretical and empirical discussion.
1.3 Institutional details on the Russian federal-
ism
1.3.1 Asymmetric federalism: Russian style
As shown above, there are three empirical papers and one theoretical contribu-
tion in this thesis. For all three empirical chapters the source of data is a sample
of Russian regions for different periods; the theoretical model is also interesting
in turms of explaining the Russian devolution (although naturally not limited
to this particular case). Hence, it seems appropriate to provide some basic in-
formation on the functioning of the Russian fiscal and political federalism in the
Introduction, since this information might be relevant for all further chapters of
the thesis.
Russia of the 1990s is in fact a good example of an asymmetric federation and
of high variation of political regimes within one country. The basic elements of
asymmetry were already inherited from the Soviet period: the post-Soviet Rus-
sia includes 89 regions (their number changed over time, see also Figure 1.1)
with partly different status. While 21 territories are called ”ethnic republics”
and exhibit a variety of elements of statehood, other regions (oblast or krai)
have evolved from traditional administrative territorial units5 or (autonomous
okrug) are even subordinate to other regions. The Soviet fiscal system (which
still exists in several former Soviet republics like Uzbekistan) was de-jure asym-
metric par excellence: each year the central government set individual retention
rates for individual regions and individual taxes (with tax rates and bases set
on the federal level). In the early 1990s this formal structure was filled with
the real bargaining; the retention rates for individual taxes / regions changes
on quarterly or half-year basis. The negotiations were basically implemented by
the federal government and a coalition of ethnic republics with more credible
threat of (at least, partial) secession than that of administrative units. The Fed-
eral Treaty of 1992, which acted as the predecessor of the current constitution,
granted special privileges to one particular type of subnational jurisdictions -
the national republics (Ross, 2000:406).
In 1993-1994, this initial pure bargaining structure experienced two major changes.
The first was an increasing level of the formal centralization. When the presi-
dent managed to consolidate power on the federal level after the dissolution of
5Yevreiskaia autonomous oblast has a similar status, although formally belongs to national
units of the Federation.
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Figure 1.1: Map of Russia
the old parliament (Supreme Council) in autumn 1993, the situation changed;
the new constitution of 1993 accompanied by the introduction of several basic
acts on inter-budgetary relations in 1994 established the de jure assignment of
responsibilities and of tax revenues between different levels of government. On
the one hand, the constitution proclaimed an identical status of all “subjects
of the Federation” (the official designation of all regions regardless of their sta-
tus). However, previous norms, as well as the informal bargaining processes
granted the national republics special privileges. On the other hand, the new
Russian federalism was based on a high degree of centralization of tax author-
ities. The exclusive list of taxes was set by the federal parliament, originally
in the Act on the Fundamentals of the Tax System, and after 1999 in the Tax
Code. There was one notable exception from this regulation: the Presidential
Decree No. 2268 signed on December 22, 1993, allowed the regional and local
authorities to introduce their own taxes. However, though several regions used
these possibilities, most taxes introduced by the regions did not even cover their
administrative expenses (although they still influenced the economic processes
as they were used to manipulate the competition between businesses to support
privileged business groups, see East-West Institute, 2001). In 1996 the Decree
was abolished, and although some regions continued using their “own” taxes,
their influence on tax revenue was fairly low. The federal government also set the
rules for calculating the tax base for all taxes. Consequently, there is only one
unified tax collection system in Russia; all taxes are administered by the federal
government.6 In a similar way, Russia became a highly centralized federation
in terms of the regulation of economic and social activities: major standards
6Some details on Russian tax system are described in Appendix A.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of regions according to the retention rates.
Source: Goskomstat, Ministry of Finance, Federal Tax Service, Federal Trea-
sury, Freinkman, Treisman and Titov, 1999
in most areas were set on the federal level, while the regional governments had
only limited ability to modify them.
Under the fiscal constitution described above de jure the only source of fis-
cal asymmetries in the tax revenue could be the differences in the tax base
endowments (any changes of federal legislation, like new tax rates or new taxes
simultaneously hit all regions). Indeed, this de jure highly centralized federal
structure was implemented in an extremely heterogeneous country. Different
regions of Russia are characterized by different resource endowments and indus-
trial capacities, different population specifics and different access to transporta-
tion infrastructure and markets. The asymmetries in tax revenue distribution
have been enormous. In the period between 1994 and 2006 the share of taxes
received by the center from different regions varied from practically zero (Sakha
in 1994 and 1995) to more than 95% (Kalmykia in 2005 and Voronezh in 2005).
Figure 1.2 presents the distribution of Russian regions according to their share
in the tax revenue from their territory. The question is, however, whether the
tax base composition is the only factor driving the heterogeneity.
Therefore in order to explain the fiscal asymmetries in Russia the second change
of the Russian federalism should be considered: the increasing bilateral and uni-
lateral activity of regions circumventing the formally highly centralized federal
law. Partly this activity took place within the framework of direct bilateral bar-
gaining between federal and regional governments, leading to the establishment
of formal power-sharing treaties which are often referred to as elements of an
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asymmetric federation (Stoner-Weiss, 1998; Filippov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova,
2004, Chapter 4). The process was to a certain extent induced by the Federal
Treaty: as two republics refused to sign the Treaty (Tatarstan and Chechnia),
and two of them (Bashkortostan and Sakha) insisted on special clauses with
larger economic rights, the way was open for the establishment of a bilateral
treaties system beyond the constitutional level. In 1994 Tatarstan and the fed-
eral center signed a special agreement with a broader scope of authorities of
the regional government, which included both re-allocation of tax income from
several taxes from the federal to the regional budget and the right to set break-
down of distribution of other taxed on a bargaining basis.
By the end of 1996 about 26 power sharing agreements with different regions
were in power, and to June 1998 their number reached 46 (i.e. more than a
half of the Russian regions). In addition more than 500 subordinate treaties
between different governmental bodies were put into action (cf. Obydenkova,
2008). What is, however, very important is that at this stage the bargaining
between the federal government and the coalition of republics was replaced by
bilateral bargaining between the federation and the individual territories (Fil-
ippov et al., 2004). The spread of power sharing agreements seems to suggest
the existence of domino effect; however, in reality the degree of autonomy in-
corporated in individual acts varied significantly (Martinez-Vazquez, 2002); a
large majority of regions did not really aspire higher autonomy, preferring to
benefit from the bandwagon effects (Gel’man, 2006).On the other hand, federal
law (parliamentary acts and presidential decrees) was used to give additional
authorities to regions.7
More important is the unilateral activity of regions leading to devolution. Its
most prominent form was “the war of laws” (introduction of regional legislation
running contrary to the federal one). While it does not automatically translate
in fiscal asymmetries, it certainly influenced the structure of Russian regulatory
federalism: as a result, Russian regions obtained significantly different degree
of autonomy, resulting into substantial differences of regional legal regimes and
economic policies (Polishchuk, 2001). Moreover, the unilateral devolution in fis-
cal area included decisions to prevent the local tax authorities from transferring
the tax revenue to the federal government – a kind of “tax separatism”.
The negotiated bilateral treaties, wars of laws and unilateral concessions cer-
tainly had an impact on the developing asymmetric federalism. However, it
would be by far too simplistic to reduce the observed fiscal asymmetries exclu-
sively to this feature. Although the significant differences between the federal
and the local regulation existed until the early 2000s (Chang, 2005), the possi-
bilities for the regions to manipulate the transfer of tax revenue to the federal
7The earliest decrees were set in 1992 and covered regions like Tyumen, Karelia (granted
the right to use 90% of federal taxes collected on its territory in 1992-1994 for funding of its
development fund) or Ingushetia (since 1994 businesses registered in this republic did not pay
federal taxes).
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government went down relatively quickly. While in 1993 about 30 regions de-
clared plans to “withhold” the federal share in the tax revenue, not a single one
really implemented them. In 1996 St. Petersburg was the only region with-
holding 20% of the land tax revenue. There were only few attempts of open
“budgetary separatism” in the 1990s. After the crisis of 1998 several regions
announced the decision to block the federal portion of the tax revenue, and the
parliament of Kalmykia (one of the national republics in the Southern part of
Russia) decided to stop payments to the federal budget, but quick and severe
actions of the federal center (e.g. the Ministry of Finance stopped funding any
federal programs on the Kalmykian territory) resulted in the abolition of this
regulation. Moreover, the major advantages obtained by the regions in bilat-
eral treaties were of non-fiscal nature – control over oil and gas exploration in
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Tatneft, the Tatarstan’s oil company, became one
of the largest in Russia) or for the diamond industry in Sakha (the ALROSA
holding). The first two treaties with Tatarstan and Bashkortostan allowed these
republics to receive all royalties from the natural resources instead of the federal
center. However, Sakha, the third region, was only able to enforce the special
privileged regime to use part of the federal taxes collected on its territory for the
funding of federal programs, i.e. a limitation was put rather on the expenditure
than the revenue side of the budget. The later treaties either did not include
any fiscal arrangements or were mostly based on the Sakha scheme. Some of
them (e.g. Sverdlovsk) set a clear right of the regions to stop transferring taxes,
if the federation does not follow its expenditures obligations. Hence, the search
for further fiscal mechanisms of asymmetric devolution becomes important.
The political asymmetry in Russia went down in the 2000s under the new ad-
ministration of Vladimir Putin. One of the first acts of the new president was
to regain control over the federal political structures in regions (what was called
“strengthening the vertical of power”): in 2000 seven new federal districts were
established in which presidential representatives (mostly with a background in
the military or security service) obtained the right to oversee the selection and
placement of personnel in the local branches of federal authorities (Ross, 2003).
Furthermore, the regional governors lost a significant part of their influence
because of institutional changes (like the reform of the upper chamber of the
Russian parliament, the Federal Council, or the right of the president to remove
a governor from his office; see Hyde, 2001) accompanied by a strong public sup-
port for the new president. Meanwhile the degree of asymmetry between regions
in tax distribution remained significant: Magadan was able to get about 98% of
the whole tax revenue in 2003 and may be compared with the most “secession-
ist” republics of the early 1990s. Indeed, the standard deviation of retention
rates increased significantly in the last six years (Figure 1.3 ). Therefore even
the Putin period seems to be interesting from the point of view of this paper.
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Figure 1.3: Standard deviation of the region’s share in the tax revenue from its
territory.
Source: Goskomstat, Ministry of Finance, Federal Tax Service, Federal Trea-
sury, Freinkman, Treisman and Titov, 1999
1.3.2 Variation of political regimes in Russian regions
As discussed above,the variation of retention rates (and, as I will show in what
follows, other decentralization indicators) makes the Russian asymmetric fed-
eralism a reasonable laboratory for studying endogenous decentralization and
its mechanisms. However, Russia is also a clear case of variation of subnational
political regimes. One could probably claim that the first differences in the struc-
ture of political systems in Russian regions occurred even before the transition
started: in the Soviet Union several national republics were able to establish
a de-facto higher autonomy in exchange for loyalty to the central government,
which, however, did not intervene in the local political process. The collapse
of the Soviet Union initiated a complex set of bargaining processes between
the federal government and the regions and of internal conflicts within regions.
And, as already mentioned, the first set of bargaining processes established the
structure of asymmetric federalism, where regions achieved different degree of
political autonomy, and a relatively weak federal center. Therefore - the second
set of bargaining processes - individual regions received the opportunity to de-
sign their own political system independently as an outcome of internal power
struggles. From mid-1990s all regional governors were elected by a popular vote
(although several regions practiced direct elections even earlier, in spite of di-
rect restrictions of the federal center). It increased the autonomy of regional
political systems, but did not guarantee their democratic nature: regional elec-
tions could be easily manipulated by the authorities. Both formal and informal
rules of elections also became subject to the bargaining process. Factors like
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ethnic and economic legacies of the Soviet period, specifics of regional leader-
ship and particular effects of economic transition for individual regions seem to
have a profound impact on the paths of formation of political systems (Hale,
2003). Further factors like political culture, initial economic development and
proximity to the EU could also have influenced the diversity of political systems
in Russia (Obydenkova, 2007). The resulting differences often resembled those
between independent states rather than regions of one country (Gel’man, 2008)
Gel’man (1999) provides a comprehensive review of the factors and driving
forces of the development of regional political regimes. He basically confronts
four scenarios of transition. In several regions a dominant actor was able to
establish a near-monopoly and therefore create a quasi-authoritarian system
similar to those of Central Asian countries or Belarus.8 Other regions provide
examples of an elite settlement based on a compromise of main conflicting groups
over the crucial aspects of policy (Nizhniy Novgorod), while the competition be-
tween clans remained an important factor of regional politics (Sharafutdinova,
2007). Yet another outcome suggests that conflicting regional elites develop in-
stitutions to avoid the ”winners takes all” outcomes (Udmurtia). The range of
different political systems in Russia varied from the pluralist democracies (St.
Petersburg) to autocracies and even ”warlordism” (Primorski krai, see Kirkow,
1995). Regional elites maintained different degree of control over the media and
over regional economies (which could also be used as an additional power source
if present or weaken the incumbents if absent).9
To conclude, the formation of political systems in the Russian regions through-
out the 1990s has been an outcome of the competition and conflict between
several centers of influence: governor, regional legislature, heads of largest mu-
nicipalities (e.g. capital of the region) and federal bureaucrats. Towards 1999-
2000 these conflicts diminished significantly, and a political equilibrium was
achieved (Turovskiy, 2003). It does not imply, that the incumbents could al-
ways win the elections (although there seems to be a trend to lower turnover of
8The most well-known examples of these groups are regions where the old Soviet elites
maintained their dominance behind the new ideological facade. For example, in Tatarstan
the leadership of the local Communist party was successful in shifting its power first to the
Supreme Soviet (regional parliament), and then to the office of the regional president Mintimer
Shaimiev, which than created a successful political machine dominating both regional and fed-
eral elections. In Bashkortostan the collapse of the Comunist party power caused competition
between the Supreme Soviet and the regional government, ending up in the formation of a
stable autocracy following that of Tatarstan. In other regions, like Mordovia or Mariy El, re-
gional elites failed to consolidate their power in spite of attempts to catch up with Tatarstan
(Matsuzato, 2004). On the other hand, in Kalmykia the newcomer Kirsan Ilyumzhinov suc-
cessfully challenged the existing regional elites, only to establish his own version of regional
authoritarianism with strict control over political processes and economic assets in the region.
9The variety of political systems reflected itself in the variety of formal institutions (al-
though Russian politics diversity is much higher than that of formal structures): from pres-
idential republics to parliamentary systems (Udmurtia, Khakassia) and more complex or-
ganizations with a governing council comprised of representatives of different ethnic groups
(Dagestan) (Kozlov and Popov, 1999:185-194).
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governors starting with 1999, see Nureev and Shulgin, 2006; Titkov, 2007), but
rather means, that the structure of veto players and of the formal and infor-
mal rules governing the way (and the possibility) of power transition was set.
The main factors influencing the political development of Russian regions in the
2000s became the activity of the federal center, trying to limit the degree of
regional autonomy. Several measures of the federal sector (e.g. the introduc-
tion of the new federal act regulating regional elections in 2002, see Konitzer
and Wegren, 2006) could indeed influence the political systems in different re-
gions (though the ability of the federal center really determine the electoral
outcomes remained relatively weak, see Chebankova, 2005). In fact, through-
out this period the federal government focused rather on establishing control
over the regional elites than on intervening in their internal politics.10 However,
these shocks either uniformly impacted all regions, or, more important, did not
depend on economic performance of the regions.11 Hence, regions still remained
politically diverse, and their political systems were mostly inherited from the
struggles of the 1990s (for details see Gel’man, 2008). Once again, there seems
to be enough space for studying the theoretical problems discussed above in this
empirical setting.
10Although some notable exceptions, like St. Petersburg, should also be mentioned.
11The Moscow Carnegie Center reported an index of democratization for individual Russian
regions for the periods of 1991-2001 and 2000-2004 (which will be discussed in greater detail in
the chapter 5). A simple correlation between the change of the democracy index of Carnegie
Center from the 1990s to 2000s (difference between the new and the old index) and the gross
regional product (GRP) per capita in 2000 yields insignificant correlation index of 0.256; the
correlation between average growth rates and the change of democracy index is even smaller (-
.0622). Moreover, the correlation between the old and the new index is 89 percent, suggesting
a high persistence in the political organization of the regions. Nikolai Petrov (2005), who was
responsible for the project of the democratization index for Russian regions implemented by
Carnegie Center, notes that although there have been several changes between 1991-2001 and
2000-2004, they are mostly of ”symbolic” nature.
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Chapter 2
Constitutions, Regulations,
and Taxes: Contradictions
of Different Aspects of
Decentralization
2.1 Introduction
One of the main problems for the empirical literature on decentralization, its
driving forces and economic impacts, is that the decentralization is really diffi-
cult to measure. The traditional indicators like retention rates or subnational
share of public expenditures have all been discussed and thoroughly criticized.
There are at least two aspects able to cause trouble while brining the theory on
fiscal federalism to the data. First, it is crucial to distinguish among the con-
stitutional and the post-constitutional stages of decentralization. Allocation of
authorities as specified in the fundamental acts of the federation does not nec-
essarily map into the allocation of de-facto authorities and, even more, of fiscal
flows. Second, at the post-constitutional level there is always a gap between
the fiscal and the regulatory decentralization; since both aspects are crucially
important for the performance of federations, any empirical approach ignoring
one of them is likely to face problems while identifying the ceteris paribus effect
of the devolution.1 The aim of this chapter is to explicitly confront different
concepts of decentralization using a single dataset. The objective is rather pos-
itive than normative: first, I try to establish a correlation between different
aspects of decentralization, and second, look at the driving forces determining
1In this chapter (as well as throughout the thesis) I use the terms “devolution” and “de-
centralization” as synonyms, what is probably slightly sloppy if one looks at precise definitions
applied in political science, but is reasonable for a study of an asymmetrically decentralized
country.
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the decentralization outcomes. From this point of view the chapter is also an
exercise in empirical endogenous decentralization studies.
It is difficult to find a reasonable empirical playground for comparing dimensions
of the decentralization, mostly because the decentralization beyond simple al-
location of revenues and expenditures is very hard to measure. As already
mentioned, this chapter takes advantage of the process of asymmetric devolu-
tion in the Russian Federation in the 1990s, and uses Russia as the laboratory
for comparing different aspects of decentralization. Given the combination of
high formal centralization in Russia with significant de-facto asymmetry, I use
three proxies to measure the degree of devolution achieved by individual re-
gions. First, a more traditional indicator of tax retention rates is applied to
measure the degree of the fiscal decentralization. Second, I use the data of the
Federal Register to obtain the share and the number of regional acts directly
contradicting federal law, thus accounting for the regulatory decentralization on
the post-constitutional level. Finally, I construct an index to obtain the degree
of autonomy incorporated in regional constitutions (using their version as of in
late 1990s), therefore measuring the constitutional decentralization.
The main finding of the chapter is that the fiscal decentralization, post-constitutional
regulatory decentralization and decentralization incorporated in constitutions
seem to be virtually unrelated to each other; moreover, different factors iden-
tified in the theory are at work for different aspects of decentralization. It is
necessary to point out that it does not follow unambiguously from the theoret-
ical reasoning that different dimensions of devolution should be correlated. On
the one hand, different preferences and rents in different policy areas are likely
to result in different levels of decentralization. On the other hand, correlation
is likely to occur as a consequence of bargaining, where different aspects of de-
centralization become subject to package deals and therefore the outcomes turn
out to be interdependent. The results of this paper, nevertheless, are relevant,
first, because our knowledge of interrelation of dimensions of decentralization is
extremely limited (and hence it is difficult to confront any theoretical result with
reality), and second, because of somewhat simplistic treatment of decentraliza-
tion in many empirical papers using just one ”true” measure of decentralization.
The latter could be justified if the dimensions of decentralization are correlated
- so, an empirical investigation seems to be of interest.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section I discuss the problem
of measuring the degree of decentralization in the literature. The third section
presents different dimensions of decentralization and looks at their correlation.
The fourth section focuses on determinants of endogenous decentralization in
Russia and the econometric problems of the analysis. The fifth section reports
the main results with respect to the driving forces of decentralization, and the
last section concludes.
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2.2 Measuring the degree of decentralization
Since decentralization seems to be one of the main concepts for economic and
political reforms in both developing and developed countries, there exists a
multitude of intersecting and diverging theoretical and empirical concepts for
measuring decentralization, often applied as “proxies” for one another (Sharma,
2006). To start with, the main problem of the literature is actually not the choice
between the “centralized” and the “decentralized” government, but rather be-
tween the political, or constitutional (which in turn may refer to the autonomy
of decision-making, autonomous appointment of governments and their ability
to participate in federal decision-making), and the administrative (which mostly
refers to the construction of public administration, i.e. deconcentration of bu-
reaucracy) decentralization (Hutchcroft, 2001; Ali, 2002; Schneider, 2003). For
a large country (in terms of population or territory) the administrative decen-
tralization is unavoidable and undisputable simply because of technical reasons
of governability. Hence, the question for the optimal degree of decentraliza-
tion usually refers to the decision-making autonomy of regional governments
(although a world with agency problems and power asymmetries administrative
decentralization may “turn into” the political autonomy of regional governments
through the informal migration of authority).
A further distinction should be made, as already noticed, between the (already
defined) constitutional decentralization and the post-constitutional decentral-
ization. The post-constitutional decentralization reflects the outcomes of the
political process, once the constitutional rules are set, rather than the rules
themselves. The distinction is particularly simple in the fiscal matters: the con-
stitutional decentralization implies the right of regions to independently decide
on revenues and expenditures of their budgets; the post-constitutional decen-
tralization, however, means just the allocation of funds between center and
regions. In countries like Germany regions receive a substantial portion of the
tax revenue, but have virtually no right to decide on the bases and the rates
for taxes (which are then federal or joint responsibility). In what follows fiscal
decentralization refers exclusively to these post-constitutional outcomes (as it is
the case in almost all empirical studies, though not all of them acknowledge it).
The situation is slightly more complicated, if one looks at the regulations. The
constitutional decentralization, once again, means the allocation of decision-
making rights on standards and norms for the economic activity. However, this
allocation may be different from the “real” significance of regional and federal
regulations for economic agents. For example, it is possible that one of the
parties (either center or states) is more active in filling their “regulatory niche”
with acts and norms, than the other. Once again, regulatory decentralization in
this paper refers to the post-constitutional “relative importance” of the federal
and the regional law for economic agents. Obviously, it is a vague concept,
which I will, however, operationalize in what follows.
This chapter therefore looks at three concepts of decentralization: constitu-
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tional and two post-constitutional (regulatory and fiscal2) dimensions of devo-
lution. The literature often attempts to combine the constitutional and the post-
constitutional analysis constructing a measure incorporating both (more simply
accessible) outcomes of regulation and (more problematic) allocation of authori-
ties; it may, however, be reasonable, if possible, to look at these issues separately.
The constitutional level is usually more stable, than the post-constitutional out-
comes, although in the developing countries it may also become quite volatile
and even determined by individual personnel decisions (and then the same post-
constitutional allocation survives a sequence of changing constitutional rules).
The list of the post-constitutional dimensions may be expanded to include fur-
ther aspects of governance (say, the allocation of personnel between levels of
political system, cf. Treisman, 2002); however, even measuring three main di-
mensions of devolution is a non-trivial task.
The literature on fiscal decentralization usually relies on indicators like share
of subnational (tax) revenues and / or expenditures, which are, in spite of com-
mon usage, also very often criticized both because of measurement problems
(impact of tax and non-tax revenues, spatial allocation of federal expenditures,
influence of interbudgetary transfers) and especially because they ignore the
degree of autonomy (i.e. constitutional decentralization) in the decision-making
with respect to fiscal matters (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002). Hence, there have been
a number of attempts to correct the data incorporating the degree of fiscal au-
tonomy in the analysis (Stegarescu, 2005). The regulatory decentralization is
obviously much harder to measure, since the variety of policy aspects to be
considered may be huge. On the other hand, it is also more difficult to come to
data for the international analysis, and the intranational variation may be insuf-
ficient. Hence, scholars usually focus on specific aspects of regulation providing
a suitable basis for the analysis. For example, Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee
(2002) test the impact of preference heterogeneity on decentralization by study-
ing the liquor control rules in the U.S. municipalities. Traub and Sigman (2007)
examine the “voluntary decentralization” in the area of several health and safety
laws in the United States.
The constitutional decentralization has been subject to a great variety of stud-
ies. The most popular approach is to construct an index, incorporating several
aspects of decentralization as well as may be several outcome measures. Marks
et al. (2008) provide a comprehensive review of these indices (as well as con-
struct their own one). An alternative could be to measure the actual policy
interconnection between different levels of government. Sheng (2007) studies
the biographies of party secretaries in China to understand the logic of political
decentralization, and Landry (2004) looks at the tenure duration and promotion
patterns of local officials as response to formal decentralization. Finally, special
political situations may provide source for analysis of constitutional decentral-
2The concepts may be similar to fiscal and regulatory interjurisdictional competition
(Oates, 2002).
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ization. For example, Hennessey (2008) discusses a specific experiment of home
rule establishment for American municipalities.
In spite of the obvious importance of the topic, the literature explicitly com-
paring different dimensions of decentralization is very small (Treisman, 2002;
Schneider, 2003; Blume and Voigt, 2008) and focuses only on international
comparisons. A related analysis is done by Liu (2007), who performs a cluster
analysis of different dimensions of decentralization in order to identify the typical
combinations empirically observed, and Falleti (2004) in a case study of Latin
American countries, who investigates the dynamic interaction of different as-
pects of decentralization. Finally, Treisman (2002) and Blume and Voigt (2008)
look at the correlation of different forms of decentralization and socioeconomic
and political country characteristics, including country size, ethnic division,
colonial origin, economic development and level of democracy. However, data
compatibility across nations adds an additional dimension to the measurement
problem. Hence it is reasonable to look at different dimensions of decentral-
ization and their origin using the intra-national variation of decentralization,
which, however, to my knowledge have never been considered empirically before.
Once the subnational variation in taken into account, a further distinction
should be made. First, one can focus on the decentralization within subnational
units, if they are different enough. For example, Feld et al. (2008) perform an
analysis of fiscal decentralization within the cantons of Switzerland, using the
extreme heterogeneity of their financial constitutions. Second, however, one
can benefit from existence of asymmetric federations and look at the variation
of degree of devolution achieved by each region versus the central government.
This chapter, as discussed, follows the second path.
2.3 Dimensions of decentralization in Russia
2.3.1 Measuring decentralization in Russia
As already mentioned, this paper looks at three dimensions of decentralization
in Russia. The fiscal decentralization is measured by the traditional variable
of tax retention rate (share of regional government in the overall tax revenue
collected from its territory). Although the data is published by the Federal
Statistical Authority (Goskomstat) on the annual basis, in order to ensure com-
patibility with other data, which are available only in a cross-section, I take the
average over 1995-1999 (with 1995 being the first year after the reform of the
federalism in 1994, establishing the existing system of interbudgetary relations
in Russia, and 1999 being the last year of the Yeltsin’s presidency before the
re-centralization attempts under Putin started). The panel data opportunities
for this dimension of decentralization are explored in the next chapter.
A unique advantage of the Russian dataset is that one can use a specific mea-
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sure for the regulatory decentralization encompassing multiple dimensions of
economic regulation. As already mentioned, the regional legislation in the late
Yeltsin period included a large number of significant contradictions to the fed-
eral law. Although the federal law existed, regional courts and regional police,
captured by the local governments, usually enforced the local law – so, the
federal acts simply did not matter for economic agents. After the start of the
Putin’s presidency, one of the first steps of the new government was to revise
the regional law in order to ensure the predominance of the federal legislation.
As part of this effort, the Ministry of Justice established the so-called Federal
Register (federal’nyi registr), or catalogue of regional acts (both of the legisla-
tures and of executive bodies, but incorporating legal norms) in power at that
moment. The acts included in the Register should pass an examination by
the expert commission established by the Ministry of Justice, which determines
their compatibility with the federal law. As a result, a statement is published,
which is then included in the file in the Federal Register as well. The acts con-
tradicting federal law should be abolished or changed; however the file in the
Register remains, even if the act is not valid any more. Although originally the
Register was unable to cover all regional acts (a revision process certainly takes
time), after several years one can be sure that most acts passed by the regions
were included in the Register.
I use the Register statistics as published by the Ministry of Justice on De-
cember 31, 2006 and calculate two indicators. First, I take the share of acts,
which were assessed as contradicting the federal law, in the total number of acts
for which an expert opinion is present (which is, as one should mention, smaller,
than the overall number of acts included in the Register), as indicator of the
degree of regulatory devolution achieved by a particular region. In order to
understand this variable, one should recall, that de-jure the Russian Federation
has been an extremely centralized political entity in terms of regulatory author-
ities, mostly vested in the central government. However, due to its weakness
regions basically received the option to “re-design” the federal law simply by
making their own acts. Hence, if the share of these acts is high, the regions
have “re-designed” the federal legislation to a greater extent and the central
regulations matters less for economic agents. In theory, higher decentralization
implies that the regional government makes different law than the federal one
(of course, in certain settings both governments produce identical policies – but
then the debate on decentralization is economically meaningless). If the share
of contradicting acts is high, it means that the regional policies are really dif-
ferent (and, in particular, “more different” than for the regions with low share)
from the federal standards, and hence, regions achieved substantial degree of
devolution.
This measure may, however, face two problems. First, it may be too small
because of the acts passed after 2001 in the Putin’s period (when the war of
laws was reduced significantly) and included in the Register. A solution were to
take an earlier date for the Register; but in this case one runs into a problem of
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potentially neglected “old” acts, which may be still under revision. Second, it is
possible that the acts are more likely to be passed in general if the region is will-
ing to violate the federal law: if it does not desire it, it just remains silent over
a certain area of regulation, which is then covered by the federal acts. Hence,
I also use the total number of acts contradicting the federal law as a proxy for
the regulatory decentralization. As shown below, both values are significantly
correlated, but it is still necessary to look at both to establish the robustness of
the results.
The devolution at the constitutional level in Russia is, as usually, a relatively
tricky part for an empirical study. There is a certain literature addressing
this problem by examining the reasons for establishment and for the duration
of power-sharing agreements (Dusseault et al., 2005; So¨derlund, 2006; Oby-
denkova, 2008). Obviously, the existence of a power-sharing agreement may be
treated as an indicator for higher constitutional devolution. However, there is
no research looking at the content of the treaties.3 This chapter does apply
a different measure of constitutional decentralization, looking directly at the
content of the regional constitutions. In the Soviet times, all union and au-
tonomous republics already obtained a constitution, mostly built according to
the same scheme. After the collapse of the USSR, most republics adopted new
constitutions. Moreover, other regions (without the status of republics) also
passed their articles (ustav). The constitutions were quite similar in terms of
guarantees and rights declared to their citizens (and hence, there is no variation
in their socio-economic content, unlike in case of, say, OECD constitutions, see
Ben-Bassat and Dahan, 2008), with may be the only exception of the agricul-
tural land private property. However, they varied quite substantially in terms
of the design of political system and also the distribution of power between the
federal government and the region. It is particularly true for the constitutions of
20 republics,4 since articles of other regions were more homogenous (although
also partly incompatible with the federal law). I use six main dimensions of
divergence in term of center-region relations for the republican constitutions (as
they were valid in 1999) in order to construct the index. The dimensions include
(see also Bartsiz, 2001):
• property on the the natural resources (regions, in spite of the federal
regulation, declare natural resources – mostly mineral – their possession
or take over the right to regulate the resources access regime);
• international agreements (regions, in spite of the federal regulation, de-
clare their right to sign the international agreements with other countries
independently from the Russian Federation);
3Although, as discussed in the Introduction, the content of the treaties was not identical
(Martinez-Vazquez, 2002), the degree of autonomy can be reasonably approximated by the
duration of the agreement. As already mentioned, in the earlier treaties the powers of regions
were mostly larger, as specified in later treaties, when the very procedure and structure of a
treaty was standardized (Boltenkova, 1998; Kurnyshov, 1998; Solnick, 2002).
4There are 21 republics in the Russian Federation, but Chechnya is excluded from analysis
given the lack of somehow reliable data.
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• state of emergency (the region takes over the right to declare the state of
emergency, or restricts the right of the federation to declare the state of
emergency on its territory);
• restrictions on regional branches of federal government (this feature ap-
plies basically to one region, Dagestan, which restricts the right of federal
agencies to establish their local branches on its territory by requiring a
special agreement);
• restrictions on validity of federal acts (the region requires federal acts to
be ratified by the regional legislature; declares its right to (temporary) put
federal law out of action; declares the priority of regional law at least in
the area of shared responsibility of the federation and the region and / or
reserves the right to take over the federal responsibilities if the federation
does not implement them) and
• special regime of interbudgetary relations (Bashkortostan and Sakha re-
serve their right to determine the share of the federation in the over tax
revenue from the region; Tyva maintains its own customs service).
Naturally, many of these provisions have never been implemented in practice.
But it is exactly what this chapter intends to test: is there any relation between
“higher autonomy” declared in the constitution and the outcomes of the decen-
tralization process as measured by the fiscal and regulatory decentralization?
I construct the index as follows: the region with respective provision receives
1, otherwise 0. Hence, the index may vary from 6 (all provisions contradicting
federal law implemented) to 0 (no provisions implemented). The components
of the index are reported in the Appendix B.1.
Obviously, all three indicators applied in this chapter are far from being perfect.
The problem of the fiscal decentralization is that formal indicators of tax struc-
ture do not cover a high variety of financial flows between the center and the
regions and between the regions and the economic actors (e.g. non-monetary
transactions, barter, and redistribution of property rights, see Eckardt, 2002).
Even despite the relatively high centralization in the field of taxation, regional
governments still have sufficient additional powers via related business groups
and banks etc (Rosefielde and Vennikova, 2004). Moreover, the use of parafiscal
funds was quite common in the 1990s.5 Put it differently, tax retention rates
may have little in common with the actual ability to produce public goods. The
indicator of regulatory decentralization may be distorted by the fact, that fed-
eral controllers of the Ministry of Justice were not entirely impartial in terms of
5For example, in Kalmykia, one of the Russian republics in the Southern region, com-
panies after registration paid a special “registration fee” to a so-called “Fund of Presidential
Programs”. Even in the modern Russia, where the degree of federal control over these schemes
is significantly higher, regional governments have enough opportunities to let the businesses
“voluntary” pay for some regional projects, creating an additional tax, which is not covered
by official statistics.
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Table 2.1: Correlation of different aspects of decentralization
Fiscal Regulatory (share) Regulatory (number) Constitutional
Fiscal 1
Regulatory -0.020 1
(share) (0.852)
Regulatory 0.071 0.686*** 1
(number) (0.513) (0.000)
Constitutional 0.170 0.087 0.084 1
(0.475) (0.715) (0.724)
Notes: numbers in parenthesis are p-values. *** significant at 1% level.
allocating their effort among regions (though a relatively late data of the Fed-
eral Register status employed here should guarantee that all regions have had
enough time to be thoroughly controlled) and the decisions on compatibility
with the federal law. Finally, the constitutions discussed rarely address directly
the issues of fiscal and regulatory decentralization; the index applied is rather an
indirect measure. Nevertheless, the status of the data is still better than in most
other cases, and hence one can at least try to establish statistical regularities in
terms of interrelation between different aspects of decentralization.
2.3.2 Interrelation of dimensions of decentralization
The first problem to be considered in the framework of this chapter is whether
different dimensions of decentralization are related to each other. Table 2.1 re-
ports simple pairwise correlations between four indicators used in this chapter.
First of all, one can see that there is virtually no correlation between different
aspects of decentralization. The same holds if other control variables are taken
into account. Hence, one can conclude, that different aspects of decentralization
process in one country, based on interaction of identical agents with (obviously)
identical preferences, result into different outcomes.
However, the absence of correlation is to a certain extent an outcome of out-
liers – individual regions with strong deviation from the common trend. For
example, excluding Ingushetia, Kalmykia, Altai Republic and Taimyr from the
sample, one obtains significant positive correlation between fiscal and regula-
tory (share) decentralization (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2 ).6 For the regulatory
decentralization measured by the number of negative conclusions of the experts
of the Ministry of Justice, the result is robust to outliers, and it is obviously
difficult to carry out this analysis for constitutional decentralization, which is an
6Three regions mentioned belong to the so-called “tax havens”, i.e. regions pursuing an
internal offshore strategy in order to attract capital, partly due to abovementioned special
regulations. Taimyr is a difficult case from the point of view of the fiscal decentralization; the
tax revenue is strongly dependent upon the activity of the largest company, Norilski Nikel,
which has actively implemented tax optimization schemes (for example, in 2000 and 2001 the
activity of this company from the point of view of VAT optimization effectively led to negative
tax revenue of the regional budget).
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Figure 2.1: Correlation of decentralization indices; red line - total sample, green
line - excluding four outliers
ordered variable. Nevertheless, even if it is the outliers which drive the absence
of decentralization, it still does not change the fact, that different aspects of the
decentralization process follow different paths.
2.4 Endogenous decentralization in Russia: data
and empirical strategy
2.4.1 Factors of decentralization
Although so far I have focused on measuring decentralization in Russia, the
aim of this exercise is to empirically identify the factors determining the degree
of devolution achieved by individual regions according to different dimensions.
From this point of view it is necessary to identify the variables able to serve
as proxies for the main theoretical factors of devolution. Simplifying a lot, one
could probably distinguish among five main hypotheses regarding the process of
decentralization. First, the decentralization depends upon the trade-off between
preference heterogeneity (or other forms of heterogeneity, which may be easier
to measure, like income) and benefits from centralized public goods provision
and insurance (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). For an asymmetric federation it
basically implies that regions with higher “preference distance” from the rest
of the country are likely to be more decentralized. Second, the federations de-
sign specific redistribution schemes between regions, which may influence the
resulting demand for decentralization (on both rule and policy level) (Buchanan
and Faith, 1987). Third, the decentralization may result from the rules (both
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Figure 2.2: Correlation of decentralization indices; red line - total sample, green
line - excluding four outliers
written and unwritten) regulating the bargaining process between the federal
government and the regions and from the relative bargaining power of the parties
(Filippov et al., 2004). Fourth, the political system (dictatorship vs. democracy;
parliament vs. referendum; presidential vs. parliamentary republic) can be im-
portant for determining the structure of the decentralization (Feld et al., 2010;
see also Chapter 4). Fifth, the outcome of decentralization may be impacted by
interest groups on federal and regional level (Ruta, 2007). One should, however,
not forget that the decentralization may simply result from the persistence in
policies and politics, and hence, be outcome of the path dependence. Thus it
is necessary for find variables to measure all factors mentioned above in the
particular case of the Russian asymmetric federalism:
Bargaining power: First, it is reasonable to assume that bargaining power is
related to the region’s economic endowment. I apply four indicators to measure
these factors: territory, population, average income per capita and share of oil
and gas extraction (particularly important for Russia). The choice of variables
seems to be relatively straightforward given the economic structure of Russia
and availability of data. Second, the bargaining power could come from the
region’s ability to secede, which seems to play an important role in the design of
the Russian federalism in the 1990s (Dombrovsky, 2006). This effect is captured
by two variables: dummy for border region and geographical distance between
regional capital and Moscow. Third, one more variable in this selection may
be share of urban population (higher bargaining power of metropolitan areas),
which, however, may also reflect preference heterogeneity.
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Bargaining rules: The main problem for measuring this indicator is that Russia
at least formally is characterized by a uniform political system. Nevertheless, I
use the following proxies: (1) formal status of the region – dummy for republics
and dummy for autonomous okrugs; (2) dummy for power-sharing agreements
(though this variable is particularly problematic due to the endogeneity problem
- power-sharing agreements are both result and consequences of bargaining) and
(3) degree of tensions between the federal center and the region: I use the MFK
Renaissance and the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs RUIE
indices of tensions to account for this effect.7
Preferences: In a semi-authoritarian country like Russia in the 1990s the im-
pact of public preferences may be significant, but should not be over-estimated.
Gel’man and Popova (2003) describe the differences of preferences in terms of
“market for symbolic goods”, where regional governments act as the “supply
side” and play the crucial role. I use three variables to measure potential dif-
ferences in preferences: (1) the preference difference may result from the ethnic
composition of the region, which is measured by the share of ethnically Russian
population8 and (2) the “distance” of the average income per capita in the re-
gion from the average over the whole Russian Federation.
Political institutions: Since Russian regions are characterized by a wide variety
of political arrangements, it is also reasonable to look at specifics of regional
politics. I look at two indicators: (1) the level of democratization, estimated by
an index of Carnegie Center, which I will discuss in details in Chapter 5 and (2)
the power concentration within the office of the the regional governors (there
are three indices available for the Yeltsin period: Jarocinska (2004), RUIE and
Urban Institute (UI)).
Redistribution: The most obvious way to capture this effect is to include a
measure of the federal transfers in the regressions, although one, once again,
may run into significant endogeneity problem.
Lobbying is measured by the index of regulatory capture, developed by Slinko,
Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2005). Since the lobbying activity in Russia is
mostly intransparent, it is hardly possible to cover it with other variables.
7It may seem to be strange to include bargaining rules in the analysis, if one recalls that
in Russia unilateral devolution often implied direct violations of federal law. However, even
in these cases, the desire of regions to ignore federal legislation depends on the “costs” and
the “benefits” of autonomy, which, in turn, may be functions of bargaining rules. Or, stated
otherwise, rules of the higher order explain why actors ignore or follow rules of the lower order.
8For the Russian Federation this indicator makes more sense than, say, religion or lan-
guage. First, in Russia the ethnic identification is very important, partly because it was en-
forced through the government for the last eight decades – from the establishment of national
republics by the Communist Party to the requirements to put ethnic origin (nacional’nost) in
passports abolished only recently. Second, religious and linguistic self-identification is usually
highly correlated with ethnicity (of course, there are deeper differences like more or less “ac-
tive” participation in the religious affairs, or degree of command of a language, but they are
also much more problematic to measure).
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Path dependence could be most simply measured by the status of the region
(for the period of the mature Russian federalism after adoption of the con-
stitution in 1993). Hence, significant results for dummy republic and dummy
autonomous region have a double interpretation in terms of rules of bargaining
and path dependence. However, for this study I use a specific indicator of dec-
larations of regional elites (based on event count by Dowley (1998) for the early
1990s9). The declarations of the first year of independence seem to be a good
proxy for the orientation of the regional elites, which could be preserved in the
future.
The variables of bargaining power, bargaining rules and preferences are expected
to have a positive sign, i.e. increase the degree of devolution; the variables of
redistribution, on the contrary, should have a negative sign, decreasing the de-
sire of the region to achieve higher autonomy. It is difficult to make predictions
for political institutions and lobbying, since the literature is inconclusive. More-
over, the path dependence variable is likely to have a positive sign, since the
active declarations of regions in the early 1990s could in fact map into higher
devolution. Details on the data are reported in Appendix B.1.
One can immediately see that this broad selection of variables faces three prob-
lems: multicollinearity, endogeneity and measurement error. On the one hand,
many of the variables are highly correlated with each other, partly by construc-
tion (i.e. tension indices include the existence of power-sharing agreements;
power indices include natural resources etc.). The problem of collinearity is
especially important for the income per capita and distance from the average
income per capita (although one should notice, that the second is not a linear
transformation of the first; so, collinearity is not perfect). It is also acute for
dummies republic / autonomous region and the share of Russians (since the au-
tonomous territories are in fact per construction of the Soviet territorial design
regions where the share of Russians is usually smaller).
The endogeneity problem is always present in research on endogenous decen-
tralization. For Russia the situation is ambiguous. On the one hand, one
can disregard several “traditional” dimensions of endogeneity like the mobility
of population (as a factor influencing both ethnic composition and population
size), partly because of short time horizon of the analysis, but partly because of
the Russian specifics (like low population migration). However, there are also
dimensions where endogeneity may become of greater importance; in particu-
lar, it is true for “bargaining rules” variables like power sharing treaties and
fiscal transfers. The decision to establish a power sharing treaty (usually re-
sulting from a long bargaining period) and the decision to manipulate federal
9This variable does not represent the current power and aspirations of governor, first,
because of the time lag, and second, because of the shift to less public political environment
in the second half of the 1990s (as opposed to the early period of Russian post-Communist
evolution).
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law / introduce a regional constitution with strong degree of devolution could
be made simultaneously; retention rates obviously depend on federal transfers,
if one takes the effect on tax effort into account. Finally, the problem may be
even greater because of time-invariant dependent variables, which prevent me
from exploiting the time variation of controls. In several cases (constitutional
decentralization, existence of power-sharing agreement) I just “fixed” a partic-
ular moment in time, when the variables were measured, what is, of course, a
huge simplification, which is unavoidable given the quality of data.
Finally, measurement errors are particularly important for what one may call
“expert opinion” variables: democratization, tensions, lobbying, declarations of
regional elites, but also power sharing treaties (the point is that in Russia the
existence and the structure of treaties were often not disclosed or only partly
disclosed; so, the variable capturing only the “main” treaties may simply lose
too much information). One should notice, that the “expert opinion” variables
are particularly problematic from the point of view of the endogeneity and mul-
ticollinearity problems as well.
2.4.2 Econometric strategy
I attempt to partly fix these problems by using the following procedure. In
the first step I estimate the “basic” specification, which does not include “ex-
pert opinion” variables. Since most decentralization indicators do not vary over
time, I estimate a cross-section for 88 Russian regions (i.e. all regions including
Chechnya) and average time-varying variables over 1995-1999. The choice of the
period is, as already mentioned, straightforward: the reforms of 1994 established
the basic structure of the modern Russian federalism, and in 2000 the reforms of
Putin significantly reduced the ability of regions for asymmetric devolution (for
example, the regional legislation and constitutions were standardized according
to the federal law).
For the fiscal decentralization and the share of negative conclusions to all con-
clusions as indicator of the regulatory decentralization the simple OLS could
be applied. The number of negative conclusions is a count variable, and hence
a Poisson or a negative binomial model should be applied. Because the data
are characterized by overdispersion, I estimate the negative binomial model (al-
though I have also estimated the Poisson model and did not find any significant
differences). Finally, constitutional decentralization is measured by a discrete
ordered variable. A usual approach to estimate is the ordered logit. In order
to solve the multicollinearity problem, I estimate two “basic” specifications for
each dimension of decentralization: with distance from average income and with
average income per capita. I also exclude the share of Russians at this stage,
since it is highly collinear with the dummy republic, in all six regressions.10 In
10It is an interesting question whether it makes more sense to include the share of Russians
or dummies autonomous okrug and republic in the analysis. From the theoretical point of view
the share of Russians is easier to explain, because the link to the preference heterogeneity is
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the regressions for the constitutional decentralization the share of Russians is
still included to control for potential effect of ethnic heterogeneity within the
sample of national republics, which, as I will show, is indeed significant.11 For
the fiscal decentralization I also include two variables measuring the structure of
the tax base, since the composition of tax revenue may as well have an impact
on the outcome (as it is discussed in the next chapter): the volume of retail
trade and net profits of the enterprises.
The next step aims to look at the measurement error and multicollinearity
problems more closely. First, I re-estimate the regressions by varying the sets
of controls and also by adding the “expert opinion” variables one by one. In
this case I am rather interested in the robust results, which keep constant over
different specifications, than in the analysis of each individual specification. Sec-
ond, as a “limiting case” for this analysis I take a completely agnostic view on
the validity of variables and theories and perform an extreme bounds analy-
sis. Obviously, for the extremely small sample of constitutional decentralization
these experiments are limited in terms of selection of variables simultaneously
included in regressions; it is inevitable, but, of course, means that I may have
lost the “precisely correct” specification in my estimates.
The third step of the analysis finally focuses on the endogeneity problem. It is
important to notice, that an unambiguous solution of this issue is hardly possible
in the framework of this study. First of all, there is no clear set of ”hypothesis-
driven” variables extended by a set of controls. In fact, almost all variables
I use (with the exception of tax base variables for fiscal decentralization) are
driven by hypotheses. Hence, however, one requires a large list of instruments
to achieve at least exact identification in the first stage - a task certainly beyond
any reasonable research exercise. Moreover, cross-sectional data with relatively
small sample exacerbate the problem of low efficiency of IV estimator. Hence,
what I am doing in what follows is in fact only a partial solution: I restrict my
attention to results, which remain robust at the second step of the econometric
strategy; therefore I ignore the problem of endogenous controls (the usual way
to deal with this issue – exclusion of potential endogenous controls and analysis
of robustness of results with and without them – is per construction performed
at the second step). As I will show, most of the “suspicious” variables actually
turn out to be insignificant, thus “resolving” me from the endogeneity prob-
lem, so, part of the problem disappears “by default”, although the cautious
obvious. However, for the Russian Federation it seems more suitable to focus on institutional
variables. First, the effect of ethnic composition of the population on policies in the short
run automatically goes through the specifics of political institutions - in this case, republican
status. Second, since Russia is a semi-autocracy at best, public preferences may be less
important than the preferences of political elites – and for the latter republican status is very
important (cf. Obydenkova, 2008). Finally, since the status of a republic was usually granted
by the Soviet government (all current republics were either republics or autonomous oblast in
the RSFSR), it is not subject to reverse causality problem.
11I have also estimated respective specification for other dimensions of decentralization,
but did not find any significant results for the share of Russians.
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interpretation of the results is necessary. There are also cases when two-stage
estimation techniques are required. Of course, in this situation the results are
based on ”hope” that the omitted variable bias through the exclusion of endoge-
nous controls and the bias from reverse causality from endogenous controls do
not run in the same direction (and hence the results become not robust in these
two settings). Hence, the results of this paper in terms of endogeneity analysis
should be treated with great caution.
2.5 Endogeous decentralization in Russia: re-
sults
2.5.1 Basic results
As the first step in the analysis I consider the “basic” specifications without
“expert opinion” variables”. The results are reported in Table 2.2. As usually,
for the OLS specifications I check the distribution of residuals using the Jarque-
Bera test; if it is significant, I estimate regression after exclusion of outliers until
the test becomes insignificant. A reasonable interpretation is possible only for
results, which are robust to this modification. However, the omission of outliers
has virtually no effect on the outcomes of the estimations.
There are several results interesting from the point of view of the theoreti-
cal predictions. The fiscal decentralization (specifications (1) and (2)) seems to
be particularly driven by the bargaining factors; especially regions with large
territory and large distance from Moscow are likely to have higher retention
rates. Interestingly enough, though the income per capita is insignificant, the
distance from average income has a significant negative impact on the degree
of devolution in fiscal area. This is a surprising result, since it means that re-
gions with higher preference distance are likely to have lower retention rates.
One possible interpretation could be that not only the size of the distance, but
also its sign matters: relatively poor and relatively rich regions have different
expectations towards federation. However, replacing the measure of distance by
the simple difference between average income in the federation and the regional
income yields insignificant results. Hence both too large and too poor regions
accept lower retention rates. It is obvious that for poor regions lower retention
rates may be associated with expectation of higher redistribution through the
federation.12 It is however more problematic for rich regions. Yet another ex-
planation could be the desire of the federal government to control rich regions
and to limit their autonomy – logic similar to the appointment policy of Chinese
government (see Sheng, 2007).
12Although fiscal transfers are not significant in the specification in this chapter, they are
in a panel data setting discussed in Chapter 3.
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Table 2.2: Factors of decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. var.: regulatory, fiscal and constitutional decentralization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS Negative Negative Ordered Ordered
binomial binomial logit logit
Fiscal Fiscal Regulatory Regulatory Regulatory Regulatory Constitutional Constitutional
(share) (share) (number) (number)
Territory 0.051** 0.051*** 0.002 0 0.129 0.119 8.957 6.247
(0.020) -0.017 (0.012) (0.012) (0.085) (0.086) (8.482) (9.804)
Population -0.01 -0.014 0.005 0.005 0.140*** 0.140*** 1.378 2.044
(0.011) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.035) (0.035) (0.867) (1.775)
Oil and gas 0.015 0.159 0.042 0.041 0.46 0.442 95.876 124.153
(0.180) (0.132) (0.04) (0.036) (0.307) (0.286) (143.094) (172.252)
Income per capita -0.042 -0.019 -0.087 1.84
(0.043) (0.012) (0.091) (6.492)
Distance from average income -0.102** -0.019 -0.082 13.23
(0.046) (0.013) (0.094) (19.367)
Dummy autonomous okrug 0.09 0.123* 0.043* 0.039 -0.188 -0.213
(0.071) (0.066) (0.025) (0.025) (0.199) (0.201)
Dummy republic 0.028 0.038 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.581*** 0.579***
(0.030) (0.027) (0.012) (0.012) (0.120) (0.121)
Distance from Moscow 0.010** 0.009** 0.006* 0.006* 0.057** 0.053** 0.837 1.364
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.023) (0.022) (0.726) (1.754)
Dummy border region 0.024 0.024 0.006 0.006 0.065 0.066 -1.857 -2.453
(0.022) (0.021) (0.010) (0.010) (0.103) (0.102) (2.694) (4.226)
Share of Russians -13.396** -10.592
(6.583) (7.801)
Urbanization 1.134 1.312 -0.636 -0.765* -2.44 -3.175 212.057* 281.125
(1.109) (1.062) (0.472) (0.454) (4.135) (4.038) (113.072) (185.913)
Fiscal transfers -0.14 -0.106 -0.003 0.009 0.154 0.205 17.297* 21.011
(0.104) (0.104) (0.039) (0.040) (0.415) (0.429) (9.758) (19.225)
Retail trade 0 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Net profit -0.004 -0.004**
(0.003) (0.002)
Constant 0.597*** 0.583*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 5.173*** 5.185***
(0.083) (0.086) (0.036) (0.037) (0.368) (0.382)
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 20 20
Pseudo R2 0.037 0.037 0.49 0.503
R2 0.277 0.321 0.407 0.404
F-stat 10.57*** 9.90*** 7.53*** 8.10***
Wald Chi-stat 90.61*** 91.28*** 26.08*** 36.63***
J.-B. test 195.3*** 134.3*** 56.37*** 63.15***
LR proportional odds test 32.28 31.44
Notes: numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. Robust
standard errors applied. For the analysis of outliers see Appendix B.2.
40
Figure 2.3: Population and total number of acts assessed by the Ministry of
Justice in the Federal Register
For the regulatory decentralization (specifications (3) and (4)) results for the
specification with number and with share of negative conclusions vary slightly.
First, one finds a strong and significant effect of the rules of bargaining / path
dependence factors: republics are on average able to achieve higher degree of
devolution, although I was unable to find any effect of the republic status for
fiscal decentralization. Distance from Moscow is also significant and positive,
but it is partly non-robust to outliers (for share, but not for number of negative
conclusions).13 Moreover, regions with larger population seem to have higher
number of violations; for the share of violations results are non-robust to speci-
fication. However, population seems to be highly correlated with number of acts
issued and assessed (because, say, large regions issue more acts or the Ministry
paid more attention to large regions; see also Figure 2.3 14), so the result can
come from this feature.
The estimations for the constitutional decentralization (specifications (5) and
(6)) are especially problematic because of small sample. It is surprising that
one obtains a reasonable statistical significance for this sample at all. Neverthe-
less, some results should be mentioned. First, in the specification with average
13The reason could be the presence of Primorski krai: a territory with a very specific “war-
lordist” political system may have generated an overproportionally high number of violations
of federal law, but may as well be especially “interesting” for federal officials of the early
Putin period responsible for the construction of the Federal Register. Nevertheless, estimates
without Primorski krai also reveal significant effect of the distance.
14The graph excludes City of Moscow as an outlier. However, it has an extremely high
number of acts assessed and very high population, thus confirming the correlation.
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income per capita urbanization and fiscal transfers seem to have significant and
positive effect on devolution; while the first effect once again confirms the the-
ory, the second may in fact indicate the presence of reverse causality in the data:
regions with higher autonomy have also received higher “pacifying” transfers.
Moreover, share of Russians has a significant and negative impact; unlike other
specifications, where it seemed to matter only if the dummy republic was ex-
cluded (as I will show in what follows), for constitutional decentralization one
finds an additional direct effect even for the sample consisting of republics –
regions with lower share of ethnic Russians seem to have higher level of consti-
tutional devolution. These effects, however, vanish if the distance from average
income instead of average income is used.
Several robustness tests can be implemented at this stage. First, I estimated all
regressions including both distance from average income and average income per
capita. For the fiscal decentralization distance is still significant and negative,
while income is not; for the regulatory (both share and number) and constitu-
tional decentralization both variables are insignificant. Hence, my results are
robust to this modification. Second, I account for the fact that dependent vari-
ables in specifications (1) – (4) are bounded from above by performing log-odds
transformation (Log (Variable / (1- Variable)) and re-estimating the regressions.
Basically, all results are robust, but urbanization and dummy autonomous re-
gion lose significance. Third, since the variables might be determined jointly, I
also estimate pairs (1) and (3) and (2) and (4) as seemingly unrelated regressions
(for other variables using system of equations is unreasonable; it is impossible
to use linear- and non-linear models in one system, and reducing all models to
linear form guarantees misspecification of at least one equation, and therefore,
of the whole system). Once again, the results are robust, with the only excep-
tion urbanization for regulatory decentralization in specification with distance
from average income.
2.5.2 Modified specifications and expert opinion variables
The next step of my analysis is, as mentioned, to look at the variations of speci-
fications of regressions, and also at potential impact of expert opinion variables.
The individual regressions are reported in Appendix B.2. I construct all specifi-
cations using the same logic. Each of the first three dimensions of decentraliza-
tion is covered by 28 regressions: 14 with average income per capita and 14 with
distance from average income. In each of these six subgroups the first five regres-
sions are modifications of the basic regression, accounting for individual factors
of decentralization. The first and the second regressions experiment with proba-
bly the most reasonable variables for the Russian devolution: bargaining power
and dummy republic / autonomous okrug. Given strong democratic deficits in
Russia and potential endogeneity of fiscal transfers, as well as unclear impact
of urbanization on power distribution, these variables should be most likely to
influence the structure of decentralization. Further regressions explore the role
of ethnic heterogeneity. The third regression estimates a specification including
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share of Russians, dummy republic and dummy autonomous okrug; the fourth
regression drops the dummies. The fifth regression is the “basic specification”
reported above. Further nine regressions add the expert opinion variables one
by one. Of course, if different expert opinion variables measure the same thing
(like different tension indices), I include only one of them (they are also usually
highly correlated); otherwise the variable, once included, remains in the specifi-
cation – so, I basically move towards regressions with larger number of controls.
For the constitutional decentralization, since the sample is smaller, I necessarily
have to focus on smaller number of specifications with a limited selection of
controls.
In order to make the comparison of the outcomes more transparent, I sum-
marize the results in the Table 2.3. As in case of the basic regressions, for the
residuals from the absolute majority of the OLS regressions the Jarque-Bera
test is highly significant, I also control for potential effect of outliers, excluding
the observations until Jarque-Bera becomes insignificant. The list of outliers for
regulatory and fiscal decentralization differs dramatically: while for the regula-
tory decentralization the main outliers are City of Moscow (due to its obvious
status of the capital and “closeness” to the federal government) and Primorski
krai, for the fiscal decentralization the list of outliers mostly includes tax havens
in different combinations (see next chapter for a more detailed discussion), sev-
eral autonomous regions (Taimyr and Aginsk Buryat), as well as two republics
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, which received a special tax regime through the
power-sharing agreement. City of Moscow and Republic of Sakha are also listed
among the outliers. Difference in the list of outliers may also confirm that the
regulatory and the fiscal decentralization were driven by different factors. More-
over, the estimations confirm that the choice of dummy republic / autonomous
okrugs over share of Russians was correct. First, if all three variables are in-
cluded, share of Russians is never significant (although dummy republic may
remain significant). Second, if the dummy republic was significant and positive
in the initial specification, after it is dropped and replaced by the share of Rus-
sians, the latter becomes significant and negative.
However, generally speaking, the results of the analysis of this stage hardly
provide new insights explaining decentralization among Russian regions. Most
results reported so far are robust to the variation of specifications and inclusion
of expert opinion variable. The latter are actually insignificant or not robust to
the selection of controls. Negative sign for oil and gas share observed in some
specifications may just come from a statistical fluctuation.15 Expert opinion
variables specifications become interesting only for constitutional decentraliza-
tion (where their robustness is most questionable). The most robust outcome is
that republic with larger distance from average income have a higher devolution
15One should recall, that in the 1990s oil extraction was controlled by the private business,
and even state-owned gas giant Gazprom was virtually outside of the control of the federal
government – so, an effect of significant federal pressure through control over businesses is
hardly present here.
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Table 2.3: Expert opinion variables and different specifications: summary of
results
Indicator Fiscal Regulatory Regulatory Constitutional
decentralization decentralization decentralization decentralization
(share) (number) (ordered logit)
Territory ++ + +
Population (+) +++ +
Oil and gas - +
Income p.c. - -
Distance from average income - - - - ++
Dummy autonomous region (-) + - n.a.
Dummy republic + +++ +++ n.a.
Distance from Moscow ++ (++) +++ +
Dummy border region +
Urbanization (+) - +
Fiscal transfers ++
Tensions
Power sharing agreement
Democratization - +++
Power -
Declarations
Regulatory capture
Notes: three signs mark a variable which has identical significant effect in all specifications.
++ mark variable which has identical significant effect in most in specifications including
full sample. + marks variable which significant effect in at least one specification. () indicate
that the result is not robust to outliers. Share of Russians not included in the table, since its
significant and negative sign crucially depends on presence of dummies republic /
autonomous region
index. This is predictable given the hypotheses discussed above. Democracy
level has a strong positive impact on the level of declarations. Thus, at least
for the constitutional decentralization democracy indeed seems to be a factor
supporting the desire for autonomy. However, the small sample for the consti-
tutional decentralization makes the analysis of course problematic. Moreover,
while in the basic specifications the likelihood ratio test did not suggest a viola-
tion of proportional-odds assumption, this is not the case for specifications with
expert opinion variables. The usual way to solve the problem is to estimate the
generalized ordered logit regression; however, in a very small sample with four
cut-off levels it is extremely problematic. 16
16Nevertheless, I still tried to apply this method for all regressions where proportional-odds
assumption might be problematic. Unfortunately, most results are extremely non-robust (and
also do not confirm observations for ordered logit). Nevertheless, the results with respect to
distance from the average income and fiscal transfers seem to be relatively robust in terms of
sign and significance. The only interesting observation is that more variables get significant
for higher cut-off levels – though the sign varies from level to level. Small size of the sample
does not allow further investigation. Democracy level turns its sign; now it becomes negative
and significant. A conservative approach would allow me to claim that there is a relatively
stable positive association between fiscal transfers and distance from the average income on
the one side and constitutional decentralization on the other; further outcomes are not robust
and may be driven by the specification and (violated) proportional-odds assumption.
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2.5.3 Extreme bounds analysis
A more formal way to approach the problem of robustness of specifications,
which becomes crucial in a small sample environment, is to implement an ex-
treme bounds analysis (EBA). Once again, this method has its merits and de-
merits. On the one hand, it is a more systematic analysis of effect of specification
on estimation outcomes. However, on the other hand, while so far my selection
of specifications was at least partly driven by the structure of theories, the EBA
simply looks at all possible combinations of regressors. Theoretically, it is possi-
ble that the “true” result is reflected just by one specification, which is “lost” in
endless combinations of EBA. Hence, it is important to interpret the results of
EBA in a conservative fashion: while they are unlikely to give evidence against
the influence of certain parameters on decentralization, if the covariates survive
the EBA, it provides additional argument in favor of the influence.
The basic approach to the EBA was developed by Leamer (1978); this chap-
ter applies both most popular versions of extreme bounds analysis used in the
literature. The original suggestion (see e.g. Levine and Renelt, 1992) was to
estimate the upper and the lower bounds by taking all possible combinations
of regressors and to look at the smallest estimate minus two standard errors
and at the largest estimate plus two standard errors. If the null is within the
interval formed by the upper and the lower bounds, the impact is not robust.
Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposes a less extreme version of the approach, consider-
ing the entire distribution of the coefficient. In this case the coefficient is robust
if the CDF(0) statistics is sufficiently high. Most applications of the EBA in the
literature assume some variables to be present in all regressions (mostly because
of theoretical results or research traditions) and vary the rest. Unfortunately,
the literature on endogenous decentralization is too young to develop similar as-
sumptions. So, I take all possible combinations for all possible variables (from
bivariate regression to regression with all possible covariates). Unfortunately, in
this setting the multicollinearity can impose very high volatility of coefficients
over regressions; however, there is no better theoretically motivated alternative.
The EBA for fiscal and regulatory decentralization is performed for 16 variables:
territory, population, share of oil and gas, income per capita, distance from av-
erage income, dummy autonomous region and dummy republic, distance from
Moscow, urbanization, fiscal transfers, tensions (RUIE), power (Jarocinska),
dummy power sharing agreement, democratization, declarations and regulatory
capture: so, regressions include from 1 to 16 covariates. I do not perform EBA
for constitutional decentralization, given that the sample is extremely small.17
Of course, for the EBA for each variable I use only regressions including this
variable. As a robust result I consider only variables with CDF(0) > .95 as in
Sala-i-Martin (1997).
17However, experiments with EBA for constitutional decentralization were performed, and
yielded no robust covariates surviving the extreme bound analysis.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis attempted to study selected problems related to economics of non-
democracies and economics of endogenous decentralization in federations in an
empirical and theoretical context of an asymmetric federal structure. Both prob-
lems of decentralization and democratization are of great importance, not only
from the scientific point of view, but also in the policy advice for economic and
institutional reforms in developing and transition countries. Therefore it seems
to be necessary to present some general conclusions regarding both branches of
the literature, which determined the choice of research agenda for this thesis.
The standard approach to research on decentralization in economics seems to
be straightforward. On the one hand, the theoretical literature explores the
determinants and the effects of constitutional decentralization, i.e. allocation
of authorities between governments on different levels. On the other hand, the
empirical research applies a number of (imperfect) proxies - most notably, share
of subnational fiscal revenues or expenditures - to test the predictions of the
theory (Figure 6.1). It means, certainly, that there exists a gap between what
is defined as decentralization in theory and what is used to measure decen-
tralization in empirical work, especially if the intergovernmental relations in the
federation are more complex. One aspect of this complexity is of course the well-
studied intergovernmental fiscal transfers issue; however, there may be further
forces at work, which make even the pure decentralization indicators (before
transfers) problematic. In particular, the problem is present if the fiscal flows
are attributed to regional budgets, but determined by the federal government
(centralized instead of decentralized federation) and / or federal government del-
egates its authorities to be implemented by regional bureaucracy (cooperative
instead of dual federation). Although U.S. is an example of dual decentralized
federations (and seemingly inspired a lion’s share of research in this area), most
European federations are at least either centralized or cooperative (and often
combine both features).
One possible reaction to the problem is to perceive the imperfection of em-
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pirical proxies as a measurement error: in this case the problem can be reduced
to finding better quantitative indicators, which account for ”real” authorities of
regional governments (Figure 6.2). In this case the ”traditional” retention rates
and shares of subnational revenue and expenditures simply do not measure the
intended aspect of the economic reality.
The results of this thesis, however, show that the relation between the em-
pirics and the theory may be even more complex: the gap is not simply a result
of measurement errors, but reflects the existence of the ”post-constitutional”
redistribution of de-facto authorities and (even more importantly) ability to in-
fluence economic processes, reflected in control over (fiscal) resources (Figure
6.3 ). Hence, the correct understanding of federal dynamics requires a detailed
analysis of all three aspects: (a) formal constitution, (b) resulting allocation
of resources and (c) the reasons for discrepancies between (a) and (b); a pro-
cess which Jenna Bednar (2008) describes as ”migration of authorities” in a
federation. Both formal and informal aspects matter in terms of economic per-
formance, but are not independent from each other.
The first paper of this thesis shows that the post-constitutional decentraliza-
tion may differ significantly from what is written in federal and even regional
constitutions; however, the design of formal constitution is crucial for the mech-
anisms generating these differences, as the second paper demonstrates using the
example of strategic tax collection. It is the centralized Russian state which gen-
erates an environment for the particular form of fiscal decentralization (through
manipulation of tax collection effort or ”war of laws”), which is in turn relevant
for economic behavior.
The second group of results of this paper is related to the interaction between
democracy and federalism. Once again, the relation between democracy and
economic performance, as well as other institutional characteristics of economy
is a standard field of investigation in both theoretical and empirical literature.
This thesis aims to show, that the discussion in economics so far missed at least
one important aspect of this problem (which has been, however, studied in po-
litical science to a certain extent): democratization in federations does never
influence both center and regions simultaneously. A more likely scenario is that
some regions turn into an ”oasis of democracy” or an area of the ”subnational
authoritarianism”. Although this finding is (as noticed) not really new for social
sciences, the thesis attempted to demonstrate that these differences in political
regimes are relevant for economic performance. The third paper of the thesis
in a theoretical framework showed how differences in regimes may influence de-
centralization process (which, in turn, sets the described complex machinery
in motion to generate economic results). The fourth paper looked directly at
the influence of subnational democracy on economic growth, as well as at the
interaction between democracy and size of the bureaucratic staff, and provided
strong evidence for economically significant effects.
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Figure 6.1: Standard approach of fiscal federalism
Figure 6.2: Measurement problem by empirical tests of theoretical predictions
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Figure 6.3: Gap between constitutional and post-constitutional decentralization:
results of this thesis
From this point of view, moreover, it is possible to notice the third general
contribution of the thesis. It demonstrated that the asymmetric federalism
(with individual degree of autonomy for each region) and subnational varia-
tion of political regimes are able to provide a good empirical playground for
studying general processes, so far discussed only in international cross-country
settings. Therefore focusing on intranational variation may support the theoret-
ical conclusions with better data and plausible identification strategies. There
is, of course, the problem of external validity to be mentioned; however, the
surprising similarity of studies dealing with Mexico and Russia in terms of the
”democracy-and-growth” nexus shows that in spite of all differences between
federations, studying their regions may be helpful from the point of view of
testing more general predictions of the theory.
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